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HELP FROM ACROSS THE POND:
APPLYING THE U.K. LAW COMMISSION'S
PRESUMPTION THAT EXCLUSION FROM
MANAGEMENT IN A PRIVATE COMPANY IS
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL AS A GUIDE TO
ASSESSING CLAIMS OF MINORITY




Investing in a closely held corporation1 without protecting one's
management expectations or ability to divest, namely by negotiating a
controlling interest or buyout agreement, is an immodest gamble. The
outcome of the investment may depend not only upon the success of
the business venture but also on personal relationships with the other
investors. When shareholders find themselves at odds, the minority is
at a significant disadvantage.
The problem of minority shareholder oppression2 arises from the
majority shareholder's ability to control corporate decision-making
coupled with the minority shareholder's inability to exit the
investment.3  This dynamic creates a conundrum for the minority
ISee generally, Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 511
(Mass. 1975) ("We deem a close corporation to be typified by: (1) a small
number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for corporate stock; and (3)
substantial majority stockholder participation in the management . . .of the
corporation."); Cf F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE
CORPORATIONS AND LLCs § 1.2, at 1-7 (rev. 3d ed.) (2006) [hereinafter O'NEAL
AND THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS] (asserting that the illiquidity of the
investment is the sole characteristic essential to the meaning of a close
corporation).
2 For purposes of this paper, the term "oppression" refers broadly to all
lawsuits brought by a minority shareholder against the majority, irrespective of
the particular cause of action or remedy sought.
3 See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for
Oppression, 48 Bus. LAw. 699, 699 (1993) ("The statutory norms of
centralized control and majority rule, when combined with the lack of a public
market for shares in a close corporation, leave a minority shareholder
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shareholder should dissension arise among the shareholders.4 Subject
to the whim of majority rule with no escape hatch, a minority
shareholder faces significant economic deprivation5 as well as a
diminished ability to participate in corporate affairs.6
Despite the inherent risks posed to an investor in a close
corporation, most U.S. and U.K. corporations are structured as closely
held.7 Close corporations provide several attractive features, including
stability, fewer formalities, and limited shareholder liability.
Unfortunately, these same characteristics contribute to the problem of
minority shareholder oppression and allow the majority shareholder to
exclude the minority from the benefits of ownership. 8
The problem of minority shareholder oppression is not unique to
close corporations in the United States.9 While minority shareholder
vulnerable in a way that is distinct from the risk faced by investors in public
corporations.").
4 See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to
Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24
J. CORP. L. 913, 916 (1999) ("The lack of a public market causes the parties to
be locked into their investments to a much greater extent than in either the
partnership or the publicly traded corporation.").
5 See Mary Siegel, Fiduciary Duty Myths in Close Corporate Law, 29
DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 384 (2004) (noting that investors in a close corporation
invest a "disproportionately high percentage of their wealth in their
corporation.").
6 See F. HODGE O'NEAL & JORDAN DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES: "SQUEEZE-OUTS" IN SMALL ENTERPRISES § 1.04, at 6-7
(Duke University Press) (1961) [hereinafter O'NEAL & DERWIN] (noting that
the "losses and injustices" resulting from a minority shareholder's squeeze-out
include his expulsion from participation in corporate affairs).
7 For a discussion of the popularity of the close corporate form in the
United States, see O'NEAL & THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS, supra note 1,
§1.2, at 1-7 (estimating that approximately "95% of all corporations [in the
U.S.] have 10 or fewer shareholders."). For a discussion of the abundance of
private companies in the United Kingdom, see HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATION AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTITIES §257, n.5
(3d ed. 1983) (observing that private companies far outnumber public
companies in the U.K.).
I See Donahue, supra note 1, at 513 ("Although the [close] corporate form
provides... advantages for the stockholders... it also supplies an opportunity
for the majority stockholders to oppress or disadvantage minority stockholders.
The minority is vulnerable to a variety of oppressive devices, termed
'freezeouts,' which the majority may employ.").
9 The minority shareholder oppression problem is international in scope,
as evidenced by claims of oppression arising in various countries throughout
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oppression may take one of many forms,'° disputes among shareholders
remain "part of the fabric of modem business organization law on a
global scale."'" The vulnerability of the minority shareholder in a close
corporation is a universal trend among private companies across the
globe; this trend suggests the need for more effective measures to
redress shareholder disputes should they arise.
The United States and the United Kingdom have addressed the
problem of minority shareholder oppression in a broadly similar
manner. "Oppression" and "unfair prejudice"' 2 are flexible yet elusive
concepts at the core of a variety of common law and statutory causes of
action that protect a minority shareholder's expectations. Although the
law of both countries provides minority shareholders with causes of
action to redress their grievances, substantial uncertainty remains
the world and by the remedies developed by such countries in seeking to
address the problem. See, e.g., Brian Cheffins, The Oppression Remedy in
Corporate Law: The Canadian Experience, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 305, 307-
312 (1988) (discussing the reform of minority shareholder protections in
Canada as a way to remedy the shareholder oppression problem); Francisco
Reyes, Corporate Governance in Latin America: A Functional Analysis, 39 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 207, 235-36 (2008) (discussing the adoption of
legislation as a solution to the minority shareholder oppression problem in
Latin America); Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in
China: Then & Now, 2002 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 36-38 (2002) (noting that
"[o]ppression of minority shareholders is a serious issue" in China); Lorenzo
Segato, A Comparative Analysis of Shareholder Protections in Italy and the
United States: Parmalat as a Case Study, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 373, 390-
408 (2006) (discussing the existing protections afforded to minority
shareholders alleging oppression and suggesting reform towards more
protective measures).
10 Among the most common allegations of oppression include "squeeze-
out" techniques such as the withholding of dividends, the mismanagement of
corporate assets, and the exclusion of the minority from management positions,
employment positions, or both. See O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 6, §3.01-
3.06, at 41-60.
"1 John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to
Minority Oppression in the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 658-
59 (2007).
12 For purposes of this paper, the terms "unfair prejudice" and "oppressive
conduct" refer to the specific grounds for statutory action available to a
minority shareholder claiming oppression, in the U.K. and in the U.S.,
respectively. "Oppression" broadly refers to all claims brought by a minority
shareholder against the majority. See supra note 2.
132 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 6:129
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS
regarding the extent to which a minority shareholder's expectations are
to be protected. Additionally, shareholder litigation can prove costly
and burdensome to both the involved parties and to the judicial systems
of each country, 13 thus calling for a more efficient and effective means
to handle such disputes.
As a matter of statutory reform and in an effort to more
effectively manage claims of oppression in the U.K., the U.K. Law
Commission proposed a presumption of unfair prejudice arising from
the minority's exclusion from management. A presumption of
oppression in the U.S. may improve the U.S. oppression doctrine for
the following reasons. First, the existing U.S. approaches to oppression
fail to provide sufficient guidance to courts in determining whether an
action constitutes oppression, but a presumption based upon structural
factors may more clearly define the circumstances warranting a finding
of oppression. Second, a presumption of oppression in the U.S. would
foster judicial efficiency by encouraging parties to settle and by
limiting the facts presented to courts to those occurring immediately
before the minority shareholder's exclusion. Third, a presumption of
oppression recognizes the unique nature of the close corporation,
safeguards against the majority's abuse of control, and encourages
minority shareholder participation.
This paper proceeds as follows: Part I describes the various
causes of action and remedies available to a minority shareholder
alleging oppression in the U.S. and in the U.K. Part II provides an
overview of the U.K. Law Commission's recommendation to codify a
presumption of unfair prejudice in U.K. law and further outlines the
basis for the presumption's rejection and ultimate abandonment in the
U.K. Part III argues that a presumption of oppression in the U.S.
would improve the U.S. oppression doctrine. Part IV illustrates that
U.S. courts, in conjunction with existing doctrinal approaches, can
apply a presumption of oppression that will assist in defining situations
where oppression arises while retaining the flexibility necessary to
fashion an equitable remedy between the parties.
13 See In re Elgindata, Ltd., 2 B.C.L.C. 354 (Eng. Ch. 1994) (illustrating
the expensive and burdensome nature of shareholder litigation because it
involves a claim of unfair prejudice requiring a forty-three day hearing and
producing court costs of £320,000 (roughly equivalent to 473,400 U.S. dollars),
where the shares at issue were initially purchased for £40,000 (59,180 U.S.
dollars) and ultimately valued at £24,600 (36,395 U.S. dollars.)).
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I. MINORITY SHAREHOLDER REMEDIES IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND IN THE UNITED STATES
The U.K. and the U.S. have developed several statutory and
common law causes of action to provide minority shareholders with
avenues of redress for their claims of oppression. Many U.S. states
have adopted dissolution statutes, typically modeled after the Revised
Model Business Corporation Act, 14 that provide for involuntary
corporate dissolution upon shareholder deadlock or a showing of the
majority's "illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct.' 15  Similarly,
U.K corporate law recognizes a statutory cause of action for oppression
upon "unfairly prejudicial" conduct,' 6 which serves as the counterpart
to the U.S. statutory remedy for dissolution upon a showing of
oppressive conduct. 17 While the phrasing of the statutory causes of
action and a court's interpretation thereof may vary, both the U.S. and
the U.K. statutory actions generally provide for a broad range of
remedies available to a complaining minority shareholder upon a
showing of the majority's acts of oppression.
14 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2) (2005) (providing that a court
may order involuntary dissolution where a shareholder has petitioned the court,
and where the directors are deadlocked or where "the directors or those in
control of the corporation have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is
illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent").
15 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2B-14.30 (2006); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
10-1430 (2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-1430 (2005). While many states
have adopted dissolution statutes modeled after the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act, the pertinent standard of liability as developed through case
law varies among states. For a state-by-state survey of the type of dissolution
statute adopted, the pertinent standard of liability, and other important nuances,
see Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 700.
16 See U.K. Companies Act, 2006, pt. 30, § 994(1).
17 See Sandra K. Miller, How Should U.K. and U.S. Minority Shareholder
Remedies for Unfairly Prejudicial or Oppressive Conduct be Reformed?, 36
AM. Bus. L.J. 579, 581-82 (1999) (noting that the U.K. and U.S. "have
developed some-what similar legal remedies for the minority shareholder of a
private company" and that an action for corporate dissolution is the U.S.
counterpart to the U.K remedy for "unfair prejudice").
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A. UNITED KINGDOM THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
REGARDING DISSOLUTION AND UNFAIR PREJUDICE
In the U.K., a complaining minority shareholder may pursue one
of many routes to recovery. At common law, a complaining minority
shareholder might seek to stand in the shoes of the corporation and
initiate a derivative action for wrongs allegedly done to the corporation,
such as waste of corporate assets, mismanagement, or breach of
fiduciary duties owed. But, because the English rule of Foss v.
Harbottle1 8 restricted minority shareholders from bringing such
actions, 19 minority shareholders attempting to redress their grievances
through this procedure faced difficulty maintaining their claims,
particularly where their claims rested on harm caused to their interest as
shareholders. Today, minority shareholders in the U.K. more often
pursue statutory causes of action; such statutory causes have become a
"bypass" to the derivative action that allows minority shareholders to
bring direct actions addressing "personal grievances., 20 Under current
U.K. corporate law, a minority shareholder is likely to seek relief
through either the statutory mechanism for the "just and equitable
21winding up" of the company or through the statutory cause of action
18 Foss v. Harbottle, (1843) 2 Hare 461.
19 The English rule of Foss v. Harbottle dictates that, in an action
involving an alleged wrong done to the company, the proper claimant is the
corporation itself. By classifying minority shareholders as disfavored litigants,
the effect of Foss was generally to bar minority shareholder actions, unless the
claim met one of Foss's delineated exceptions. One such exception included
the derivative action; however, a minority shareholder was prevented from
bringing suit against the majority where the alleged action was legally capable
of ratification under the article of incorporation or otherwise by law. See
generally A.J. BOYLE, MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS' REMEDIES 1-23 (Barry Rider
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press)(2002). For a complete discussion and critique of
the rule of Foss and its exceptions, see id. at 1-59.
20 Id. at 22-23 ("It is a commonplace observation of company law
textbooks that minority shareholders today tend to seek relief by means of a
section 459 [the predecessor to section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 and
identical in language] petition for unfair prejudice rather than by common law
actions under the 'exceptions' to Foss v. Harbottle"). Additionally, Professor
Boyle notes that a minority shareholder more frequently resorts to an unfair
prejudice petition where he seeks to remedy "personal grievances." Id. at 23.
21 See BOYLE, supra note 19, at 91-92 (noting that while the court's
involuntary judicial dissolution power has been long recognized in U.K. law,
the latest codification of the "just and equitable winding up" remedy is set forth
in the Insolvency Act of 1986 and serves as the modem basis for analyzing the
propriety of judicial dissolution); see also U.K. Insolvency Act, 1986,
§122(1)(g) (providing that a court may order dissolution of a company where
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protecting minority shareholders from oppression, originally adopted
and codified in the Companies Act of 1980 as the "unfair prejudice"
remedy.
22
1. THE STATUTORY REMEDY OF "JUST AND EQUITABLE
WINDING UP"
Pursuant to the statutory power to order a just and equitable
winding up, courts retain the broad discretion to order dissolution of a
company consistent with equitable principles. 23  In Ebrahimi v.
Westbourne Galleries, Ltd. ,24 the leading case to address the nature and
scope of the just and equitable winding up power, the House of Lords
25
stated that, even in the absence of an agreement dictating legal rights
among shareholders, equitable considerations enable a court to consider
whether the circumstances warrant dissolution. 26 While the House of
Lords in Ebrahimi indicated that providing a comprehensive definition
of the equitable grounds for dissolution was impossible, it provided
guidelines as to when conduct may justify a dissolution based in
"the court is of the opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should
be wound up").
22 See BOYLE, supra note 19, at 90 ("The Cohen Committee, as long ago
as 1945, designed what was to become a statutory remedy against the
oppression of minority shareholders in the form of section 210 of the
Companies Act 1948.... The Jenkins Committee's [later] proposals for a new
'unfair prejudice' remedy were, after a long delay, implemented by section 75
of the Companies Act 1980."). For the operative provision of the unfair
prejudice remedy in the latest re-enactment of the Companies Act, see U.K.
Companies Act, 2006, pt. 30, § 994.
?3 See BOYLE, supra note 19, at 92 ("The effect of section 122(l)(g) of the
Insolvency Act 1986 is to enable the court to subject the exercise of legal rights
to equitable considerations...").
24 Ebrahimi v. Westboume Galleries, Ltd. [1973] A.C. 360 (H.L.).
25 The House of Lords forms the upper house of the U.K. Parliament and
the highest court in the U.K. The core legislative duties of the House of Lords
include making, debating, and passing all laws, scrutinizing the work of other
governmental bodies, and providing a forum of independent expertise
comprised of specialist committees. See U.K. Parliament, Parliament's Role,
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role.cfm (last visited May 13, 2009).
26 Ebrahimi, supra note 24, at 379-80.
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equity. Because courts consider dissolution an extreme remedy to be
granted only sparingly, minority shareholders more often pursue their
claims under the statutory remedy for unfair prejudice.
28 Notably,
courts have applied the Ebrahimi factors for granting dissolution based
29
in equity to define unfair prejudice.
2. THE STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR UNFAIR
PREJUDICE
Under section 994 of the U.K. Companies Act of 2006, a
shareholder may petition the court on the basis that the company's
affairs have been or are currently being conducted in an "unfairly
prejudicial" manner.30 The provision is a re-enactment of section 459
of the Companies Act of 1985. 3' Upon a showing of unfairly
prejudicial conduct, a court may impose one of a wide range of
remedies, including regulating the corporation's future conduct through
injunctions, permitting the shareholder to proceed with a derivative
action, or providing for a buyout of the complainant's shares.
32
The act neither describes unfairly prejudicial conduct nor
provides any examples thereof.33 A court's finding of unfair prejudice
initially involved a flexible standard based on case-by-case court
27 As set forth in Ebrahimi, the equitable factors justifying dissolution, in
the absence of a shareholder agreement documenting legal rights, include the
following: (1) an association, formed or continued on the basis of a personal
relationship, involving mutual confidence; (2) an agreement or understanding
that all or some of the shareholders shall participate in the conduct of the
business; and (3) restriction upon the transfer of the members' interest in the
company. As noted in Ebrahimi, an order of dissolution based in equity would
seemingly require the satisfaction of one or more of these elements. Id.
28 See id. at 103 (noting the significant effect of the "alternative" remedy
provision of the just and equitable winding up remedy on shareholder claims
and further noting that the unfair prejudice remedy has become a "more
inclusive remedy both substantively and in terms of the remedial orders that
might be made").
29 Id. at 91 (noting that the Ebrahimi principles "have been employed to
illuminate the meaning of the concept of 'unfair prejudice,' as it applies to
small private companies"); Additionally, as discussed infra Part II.A, the U.K.
Law Commission relied on the Ebrahimi factors in its initial proposal for
reform of the unfair prejudice remedy.
30 See U.K. Companies Act, 2006, pt. 30, § 994(1).
31 Compare U.K. Companies Act, 2006, pt. 30, §§ 994-996, with U.K.
Companies Act, 1985, pt. 17, §§ 459-461.
32 See U.K. Companies Act, 2006, pt. 30, § 996.
33 See id. § 994.
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determinations of what types of conduct warranted judicial
intervention.34 Thus, prior to the House of Lords' decision in O'Neill v.
Phillips, discussed infra Part I1B, British courts had developed an
imprecise notion of unfair prejudice while retaining broad discretion in
finding unfairly prejudicial conduct.35 Accordingly, uncertainty often
arose in defining what conduct constituted unfair prejudice. In
determining whether conduct is unfairly prejudicial for purposes of the
current provision, U.K. courts have emphasized both commercial
conduct in light of the actual agreement between the parties and the
parties' "reasonable expectations" in the corporate undertaking.
36
B. STATES: OPPRESSION AND THE STATUTORY REMEDY OF
DISSOLUTION
Like the U.K. and many other countries, U.S. law in most
jurisdictions provides relief to complaining minority shareholders either
by statute or as a matter of common law.37  The Revised Model
Business Corporation Act, which has been adopted in whole or in part
by a majority of U.S. jurisdictions,38 prescribes a U.S. counterpart to
34 See BOYLE, supra note 19, at 94 (noting that the notion of unfair
prejudice might be best described as a "general standard to guide the court as to
what kind or degree of misbehaviour or mismanagement should justify the
court, on hearing a petition under section 459 [the predecessor to section 994 of
Companies Act 2006], in exercising its powers of intervention under section
461 [the predecessor to section 996 of Companies Act 2006]").
" See id. at 94-95.
36 See Miller, supra note 17, at 605 (noting that while the unfair prejudice
statute does not provide a comprehensive definition of "unfairly prejudicial
conduct," British courts have looked to commercial conduct in light of any
actual agreement between the parties and the reasonable expectations arising
out of any agreement to define such conduct).
37 See Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 662-63 (noting that the
development of relief for minority shareholder oppression in the U.S. can be
divided into roughly three groups: states developing relief as a "matter of
common law jurisprudence;" states whose legislatures have adopted
"comprehensive statutes," which provide for relief upon oppression and also
"describe the behavior that triggers such a cause of action;" and states which
have "declined to create a judicially imposed doctrine of shareholder
oppression for closely held corporations").
38 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, CORPORATION LAW AND EcONoMics 2, 16
(2002) (noting that at least twenty-four states have adopted the Revised Model
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the U.K. cause of action based on the majority's unfairly prejudicial
conduct.3 9  This statutory cause of action allows a shareholder to
petition for judicial dissolution upon shareholder or director deadlock
or upon "illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct" of the directors or
those in corporate control.4 °  Similar to the U.K. unfair prejudice
remedy, the Revised Model Business Corporation Act and state
legislatures adopting the act generally have not defined what types of
acts constitute oppressive conduct.4'
Courts reluctant to resort to the extreme measure of judicial
dissolution but increasingly sympathetic to the vulnerability of the
minority shareholder have enlarged the rights of minority shareholders
by broadly interpreting oppressive conduct and by providing a wide
range of remedies upon a finding of oppression.42 Although a limited
number of state dissolution statutes broadly set forth what acts
constitute oppressive conduct, 43 courts are typically faced with the
Business Corporation Act in whole and that many other states have adopted it
in part).39 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2) (2005).
40 Id. While many state dissolution statutes provide for involuntary
judicial dissolution upon a showing of the majority's "oppressive conduct,"
some state dissolution statutes contain a variation of this language. Other state
statutes may permit a minority shareholder to bring an action for involuntary
dissolution, but do not expressly use the term "oppressive conduct." For a
state-by-state survey of the various types of dissolution statutes adopted among
U.S. states, see Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 700.
41 Compare U.K. Companies Act, 2006, pt. 30, § 994(1), with MODEL
Bus. CORP. ACT § 14.30(2) (2005), and Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at
662-63.
42 See Matheson & Mater, supra note 11, at 674-75 (noting that courts
would not traditionally order dissolution in the absence of extreme
circumstances, but as courts have become "somewhat more sympathetic to
minority claims," the rights bestowed on minority shareholders have
broadened); see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 707-08 (noting that because
"the statutory grounds for judicial dissolution now are substantially broader,"
and because "state legislation authorizes more remedies as alternatives to
dissolution" than previously warranted, state statutes providing for involuntary
dissolution have become broader grounds for claiming minority shareholder
oppression).
43 These "comprehensive statutes" establish a cause of action for minority
shareholders claiming oppression, and also attempt to "describe the behavior
that triggers such a cause of action." See Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at
663. For example, the New Jersey Corporations Act provides for a range of
remedies, including dissolution, upon certain types of director or majority
shareholder behavior, including fraudulent or illegal conduct, mismanagement,
abuse of authority, or upon oppressive or unfair actions towards the minority.
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challenge of defining oppressive conduct without any guidance from
the dissolution statute.
State courts have developed various standards for defining
oppressive conduct within a particular jurisdiction. 44 One standard
involves assessing whether the majority has defeated the minority
shareholder's "reasonable expectations.'A5 Recently, this approach
received increased recognition.46 Some state legislatures, such as those
in Minnesota and North Dakota, have explicitly directed in their
dissolution statutes that courts consider the minority shareholder's
Id. at 666. While state legislatures adopting "comprehensive statutes" attempt
to provide some guidance to courts in defining oppressive conduct, a
presumption of oppression grounded in structural factors, as discussed infra
Part III.A., may provide more appropriate and helpful guidance in the U.S.
44 See Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close
Corporations: Oppression, Fiduciary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations, 28
J. CORP. L. 371, 376 (2003) ("Judicial interpretation of the term 'oppressive'
may be divided into three broad approaches, though the demarcations among
them are not distinct."). The three approaches to defining oppression for
purposes of the statutory remedy for dissolution upon "oppressive conduct"
include the following: (1) oppression as "wrongful conduct," (2) oppression as
breach of a fiduciary duty, and (3) oppression as breach of the minority's
"reasonable expectations." Id. These approaches to defining "oppressive
conduct" roughly mirror the approaches followed by states developing
remedies for oppression primarily as a matter of common law jurisprudence.
See Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 674-89. These common law
approaches include the "Bad Faith" or Delaware approach, the "Fiduciary
Duty" or Massachusetts approach, and the "Reasonable Expectations"
approach. See id.
45 See generally Art, supra note 44, at 389-90 (noting that the "reasonable
expectation" approach to defining oppression, discussed infra Part III.A,
examines the minority's expectations with respect to the majority's challenged
action).
46 See Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 679 ("While the reasonable
expectations model may not yet fully represent a majority rule, courts in at least
twenty-one states have applied the language in some form. Courts in several
states have adopted the reasonable expectations test without 'enabling'
language from the [involuntary dissolution] statute itself; that is, courts have
applied the test even when the statute only provides that dissolution is available
when conduct is 'oppressive."').
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reasonable expectations in determining whether the majority acted in an
47oppressive manner.
Other jurisdictions, recognizing the unique nature of the close
corporation, impose judicially created fiduciary duties on shareholders
in a close corporation and define oppressive conduct as a breach of
48such duty. Yet other states treat shareholders in a close corporation
no differently than investors in a public corporation and find oppression
only in the event of the majority's "wrongful conduct. 4 9 However, as
discussed infra Part III.A, regardless of the particular approach a state
may follow in defining oppression, the approach alone cannot provide
adequate guidance to a court handling claims of minority shareholder
oppression in the U.S.
II. PRESUMING OPPRESSION: PROPOSED REFORM OF THE
UNFAIR PREJUDICE REMEDY IN THE U.K.
In an effort to more effectively manage claims of unfair prejudice
arising in U.K. private companies, the U.K. Law Commission,5° prior
47 See MiNN. STAT. § 302A.751 (2004) (providing for involuntary judicial
dissolution where the directors or those in control of the corporation acted in an
"unfairly prejudicial" manner, and further directing that the "reasonable
expectations of all shareholders as they exist at the inception and develop
during the course of the shareholders' relationship with the corporation and
with each other" is one consideration that a court must take into account in
granting relief); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(4) (2005) (providing for court-
ordered relief upon the majority's oppressive conduct and further providing that
the court must consider the reasonable expectations of the corporation's
shareholders both at the time of the corporation's formation and as developed
during the course of the business relationship).
48 This approach, also known as the Massachusetts or "Fiduciary Duty"
approach, defines oppression as breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the minority
and, as discussed infra Part III.A, depends on what duties the majority owes.
See Art, supra note 44, at 377-78; see also Matheson & Maler, supra note 11,
at 675.
49 This third approach, also known as the Delaware or "Bad Faith"
approach, defines oppression as "wrongful conduct." See Art, supra note 44, at
376-77; see also Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 683.
50 The U.K. Law Commission is the independent advisory body created by
the Law Commissions Act of 1965. The Law Commission's primary tasks, as
prescribed by statute, include reviewing laws and recommending reform where
the Commission deems it necessary. One other duty assigned to the Law
Commission includes receipt of proposals for reform of the law. The
Commission examines and adopts a particular view before transferring the
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to the re-enactment of the Companies Act in 2006, recommended
codifying a presumption of unfair prejudice following the minority's
exclusion from management and the fulfillment of other factors.
However, the proposal was hastily dismissed during the consultation
phase. Despite its rejection as a matter of U.K. statutory law, such a
presumption could serve as a helpful guide for U.S. courts handling
claims of shareholder oppression.
Part II.A provides a background and overview of the
presumption of unfair prejudice, as proposed in U.K. law. Part 11.8
discusses the basis for the ultimate dismissal of the Law Commission's
recommendation to codify the presumption as part of the unfair
prejudice remedy.
A. BACKGROUND AND MECHANICS OF THE PRESUMPTION OF
UNFAIR PREJUDICE
Before the adoption of the Companies Act of 2006, the U.K. Law
Commission set forth several recommendations for reform of U.K.
minority shareholder remedies. In its Consultation Paper, the Law
Commission proposed the adoption of a second statutory cause of
action to supplement the existing provision under section 459. 5I The
proposed cause of action was intended to "provide a more streamlined
procedure" for handling certain disputes commonly brought under
section 459, whose broad wording usually resulted in time-consuming,
complicated, and expensive litigation.
52
The determination of which cases to shift from the original
provision to the proposed cause of action was based on a study showing
three trends: (1) most companies involved in unfair prejudice
proceedings under section 459 were private companies with five or
fewer shareholders; (2) the most commonly pleaded allegation was
proposed reform to another agency for examination. See Law Commission,
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
51 U.K. Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies: A Consultation Paper
(Consultation Paper No. 142), 1996, pt. 18. [hereinafter Consultation Paper].
52 See U.K. Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies (Law Commission
Report No. 246), 1997, pt. 3, para. 3.1 [hereinafter Report No. 246] ("The aim
of such a remedy would be to provide a more streamlined procedure for dealing
with some of the most common disputes which are currently brought under
section 459, thereby reducing the time and costs spent on such disputes.").
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exclusion from management; and (3) most petitioners sought a buyout
of their shares. 53  Accordingly, the proposed cause of action was
designed to allow minority shareholders in private companies of two to
five shareholders to petition the court based primarily on their
exclusion from management, that is, without first establishing unfair
prejudice as required under section 459.54 Additionally, the proposed
cause would have required a showing that the corporate association was
formed on the basis of a "personal relationship" and that before the
minority shareholder's exclusion, all shareholders agreed that the
complaining shareholder would participate in the company's
management.55
Absent a showing of the minority shareholder's gross
misconduct, the separate unfair prejudice procedure would allow a
court to order the limited remedy of a buyout of the minority's shares,
either by the company or by other shareholders, at a fair value.
56
However, in a later version of its report,5 7 the Law Commission
expressed concern over adopting an additional remedy for unfair
prejudice in small companies. Factors such as potential arbitrariness in
its application,58 possible duplication of claims, possible complication
53 Id. at app. E.
54 See BOYLE, supra note 19, at 119 ("Without the usual burden in a
section 459 [unfair prejudice] petition of establishing unfair prejudice, the
petitioner in the envisaged procedure could apply to the court for an order on
the grounds of exclusion from participation in management .... ).
55 See Consultation Paper, supra note 51, pt. 18 (noting the Law
Commission's guidelines for determining "unfairly prejudicial" conduct for
purposes of the proposed additional remedy mirror two of the equitable factors
set forth in Ebrahimi, which the House of Lords suggested were sufficient to
warrant an order for judicial dissolution). See supra notes 24-29 and
accompanying text (in its Consultation Paper, the Law Commission suggested
that a minority shareholder petitioning the court under the additional remedy
for unfair prejudice must ordinarily demonstrate the satisfaction of the first two
factors - that the business association was formed and continued on the basis of
a "personal relationship," and the existence of an agreement, or understanding,
that all or some of the shareholders will participate in the affairs of the
business).
56 See Consultation Paper, supra note 5 1, pt. 18.
57 See Report No. 246, supra note 52, pt. 3.
58 The Law Commission noted that several respondents to their initial
report expressed the belief that drawing the line at two to five shareholders
required before a minority shareholder may petition under the new remedy was
arbitrary. Id. pt. 3, para. 3.18.
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of shareholder proceedings, 59 and debate over the degree of flexibility
to be achieved by the new remedy6° led the Law Commission to
disfavor the proposed cause of action.61 Nevertheless, after noting the
need for a "rough and ready" remedy to handle shareholder disputes,
62
the Law Commission ultimately revised its initial proposal and
advanced an "alternative approach.
63
The Law Commission's "alternative approach" sought to achieve
the same objectives as the initially proposed remedy while avoiding its
flaws, namely the duplication of proceedings. 64 In a report issued
subsequent to its Consultation Paper, the Law Commission proposed
amending the existing unfair prejudice remedy to raise the presumption
of unfairly prejudicial conduct upon a showing of the minority
shareholder's exclusion from management, inter alia.65 Additionally,
59 The Law Commission believed that there would be circumstances where
permitting a minority shareholder to bring a claim under a new unfair prejudice
remedy would "simply extend the length of proceedings and add to the costs."
Id. pt. 3, para. 3.22.
60 Some respondents suggested that, to achieve flexibility, the new remedy
should allow courts to order more than a buyout of the minority's shares upon a
successful petition. On the other hand, the Law Commission believed that if
the remedy were made more flexible, "it would largely defeat its purpose and
would add little to the existing provisions." Id. pt. 3, para. 3.25.
61 Id. ("For these reasons we do not favour the introduction of a new unfair
prejudice remedy for smaller companies along the lines proposed .....
62 See id. pt. 3, para. 3.23.
63 See id. pt. 3, paras. 3.26-3.3 1.
64 The Law Commission stated that the "alternative approach" embodied
by the presumptions would further the policy objectives of the originally
proposed additional remedy for unfair prejudice, including certainty, judicial
efficiency, and providing a "speedy and economical exit route" for petitioning
shareholders, which would prove beneficial to both the minority and majority
shareholders while also avoiding duplication of remedies and retaining
flexibility in fashioning a remedy. See id. pt. 3, paras. 3.19 & 3.26-3.29.
65 The Law Commission's proposed presumption of unfair prejudice upon
the minority's exclusion reads as follows:
Accordingly, we recommend that there should be
legislative provision for presumptions in proceedings under
sections 459-461 [the predecessors to sections 994-996 of
Companies Act 2006] that, in certain circumstances, (a)
where a shareholder has been excluded from participation
in the management of the company, the conduct will be
presumed to be unfairly prejudicial by reason of the
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where the respondent company failed to rebut the presumption of
unfairly prejudicial conduct and the court found that a buyout was
proper, the court was to apply a second presumption that a pro rata
valuation was proper.66 While the Law Commission recognized that
the presumption would not flawlessly handle all shareholder disputes, it
believed a presumption of unfair prejudice would "do substantial
justice between the parties."
67
In an effort to steer away from highly fact-driven disputes, the
Law Commission based the conditions triggering the presumption on
"structural factors" 68 rather than the expectations of the parties. 69 The
presumption would apply to private companies limited by shares 70 and
upon the complaining minority shareholder's exclusion from
exclusion; and (b), if the presumption is not rebutted and
the court is satisfied that it ought to order a buy out of the
petitioner's shares, it should do so on a pro rata basis. Id.
pt. 3, para. 3.30.
66 The paper states that where "the presumption is not rebutted and the
court is satisfied that it ought to order a buyout of the petitioner's shares, it
should do so on a pro rata basis." Id. This in-artful drafting makes unclear
whether the presumption refers to the appropriateness of a buyout or the
appropriateness of a pro rata valuation upon a finding that a buyout is proper.
Nevertheless, the former possibility is illogical because it would arise only after
the court finds it ought to order a buyout. Further, para. 3.60 states, "[T]he
court may provide for the presumption to be displaced if the only shares to be
purchased are for example preference shares with limited rights to receive
dividends and capital. The court may consider that some simpler method of
valuation would be appropriate."67 Id. pt. 3, paras. 3.23 & 3.26-3.29.
68 Id. pt. 3, para. 3.32 ("The circumstances giving rise to the presumptions
need to be as easily ascertainable as possible .... [T]he presumptions should
not, so far as possible, rely on arbitrary factors; rather they should be based on
clearprinciples.").
9 Id. pt. 3, para. 3.37 ("We [the U.K. Law Commission] consider that the
presumptions should be based on 'structural' factors . . . rather than the
expectations of the parties. Clearly, these matters are less open to factual
disputes than conditions derived from Ebrahimi. They have the advantage of
being readily ascertainable by reference to the current... state of affairs.").
70 Id. pt. 3, para. 3.39 (noting that the proposed presumptions target
owner-managed companies, which are far more likely to be subjected to unfair
prejudice claims than other types of companies). In the U.K., a private
company limited by shares, as statutorily defined, is a non-public company
whose shareholders enjoy limited liability, and whose shares may not be
offered to the general public. See U.K. Companies Act, 2006, pt. 1, §§ 3.1-3.2;
U.K. Companies Act, 2006, pt. 1, §4.1; U.K. Companies Act, 2006, pt. 20, §
755(1).
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management. 71 Acts constituting exclusion from management would
include removal as a director or other actions preventing the carrying
out of a director's duties. 72 Further, the complaining shareholder would
be required to show that, immediately before the exclusion, two
circumstances existed: first, the shareholder held no less than 10% of
the voting rights at general meetings on all or substantially all
matters; 73 and second, all or substantially all of the corporation's
members served as directors.74 These last two requirements reflected
the Commission's specific targeting of "owner-managed" companies.75
Once the above conditions were met, the respondent company
could rebut the presumption of unfair prejudice by showing that the
petitioner's conduct justified his removal or that the petitioner had no
legitimate expectation of continued participation in company
management.76 Where the respondent failed to rebut the presumption
and the court found that ordering a buyout would be appropriate, a
71 Report No. 246, supra note 52, pt. 3, para. 3.40 ("The presumptions
should apply where the petitioner has been excluded from participating in the
management of the company.").
72 Id. pt. 3, paras. 3.40-3.43. For purposes of the presumption, exclusion
from management includes situations where the petitioning shareholder has
been formally removed from his position as director, or where he is prevented
from carrying out his duties as directors. A petitioning shareholder is
prevented from carrying out his duties as director in a variety of situations,
including where the respondent fails to consult with him on major decisions,
fails to invite him to board meetings, or fails to supply him with other pertinent
information. See id. pt.3, para. 3.41.
73 Id. pt. 3, para. 3.53 ("We recommend that the presumption should apply
where, immediately before the exclusion from participation in the management
... the petitioner held shares in his sole name giving him not less than 10% of
the rights to vote at general meetings of the company on all or substantially all
matters .. ").
74 Id. ("We recommend that the presumption should apply where,
immediately before the exclusion from participation in the management ... all,
or substantially all of the members of the company were directors.").
75 Id. pt. 3, para. 3.44 (noting that the conditions triggering the
presumption based on the make-up of the company immediately before the
petitioning shareholder's exclusion reflect an effort to target "owner-managed
companies").
76 Id. pt. 3, para. 3.54.
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second presumption was to arise that a pro rata rather than discounted
77valuation of the minority's shares was proper.
B. ULTIMATE FATE OF THE PROPOSED PRESUMPTION
During the consultation process, the Department of Trade &
Industry (DTI) Company Law Review Steering Group 78 met the Law
Commission's proposed presumption of unfair prejudice with
resistance. 79 After expressing its concerns with the presumption in a
later report 8° the Steering Group ultimately rejected the codification of
a presumption of unfair prejudice in its Final Report.8' In a later re-
enactment of the U.K. Companies Act, U.K. lawmakers followed the
Steering Group's recommendation and reinstated the unfair prejudice
82remedy without any amendment to codify the presumption.
77 Id. pt. 3, paras. 3.57-3.62. Valuation of a petitioner's shares on a pro
rata basis entails valuing the company as a whole, and then apportioning that
value "rateably to the individual shareholdings." Id. pt. 3, para. 3.59.
78 The former Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), subsumed by the
Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, was the
government department responsible for Company Law, and other various areas.
As discussed supra note 50, one of the responsibilities of the U.K. Law
Commission includes recommending reform of the law. The Law
Commission's proposal for reform is then sent to another governmental agency
for review in a consultation process. The Law Commission solicited comments
from the legal, academic, and business fields, and prepared a formal report on
the unfair prejudice remedy, which was then issued to the DTI. See
Consultation Paper, supra note 51. The DTI then reviewed the report and
made its own recommendation regarding the proposal for reform.
79 Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) Company Law Review Steering
Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the
Framework (DTI, URN 00/656, March 2000) [hereinafter Developing the
Framework] (affirming the rejection of the Law Commission's proposed
presumption of unfair prejudice).
80 See Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) Company Law Review
Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy:
Completing the Structure (DTI, URN 00/1335, November 2000) [hereinafter
Completing the Structure] (confirming the rejection of the Law Commission's
proposed presumption of unfair prejudice).
81 See Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) Company Law Review
Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Final
Report [hereinafter Final Report] (DTI, URN 01/942 and URN 01/943, July
2001), vol. 1, para. 7.41.
82 Compare U.K. Companies Act, 2006, pt. 30, §§ 994-996, with U.K.
Companies Act, 1985, §§459-461. The operative provision of the unfair
prejudice remedy codified in the U.K. Companies Act 2006 reads as follows:
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In Developing the Framework,3 the Steering Group responded to
the Law Commission's recommendation.84 After labeling the results of
the consultation process concerning the presumptions as "mixed and
inconclusive," the Steering Group stated that at that time it was
"inclined to doubt whether the case for the presumptions has been
made., 8 5 The Steering Group's skepticism stemmed from beliefs that
the presumptions would encourage litigation and were open to abuse
because presuming unfairness merely upon exclusion from
management would be inequitable and unreasonable.86 Also, the
Steering Group questioned whether the presumptions were consistent
with the House of Lords' opinion in O'Neill v. Phillips decided one
year earlier.
87
In O'Neill v. Phillips, the House of Lords examined the scope of
the unfair prejudice provision for the first time. 88 Recognizing that
several sources, including the articles of incorporation and other
shareholder agreements, regulated the affairs of the corporation, Lord
Hoffman concluded that a complaining shareholder would not
(1) A member of a company may apply to the court
by petition for an order under this Part on the
ground-
(a) that the company's affairs are being or have
been conducted in a manner that is unfairly
prejudicial to the interests of members generally
or of some part of its members (including at least
himself), or
(b) that an actual or proposed act or omission of
the company (including an act or omission on its
behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.
U.K. Companies Act, 2006, pt. 30, § 994(1).
83 See Developing the Framework, supra note 79, ch. 4.
84 See id. paras. 4.102-4.111 ("Law Commission Proposals on Section
459").85 Id. para. 4.104.
86 See id.
87 Id. para. 4.110 ("[I]t seems that it may now be more difficult to adopt
the Commission's proposal to create a statutory presumption that unfair
prejudice has been suffered. In the light of O'Neill v. Phillips, it is difficult to
see how the facts proposed by the Commission as sufficient to give rise to such
a presumption could now be regarded as prima facie indication of unfair
prejudice .... ) (citation omitted).
88 O'Neill v. Phillips, (1999) B.C.C. 600 (H.L.) (U.K.).
148 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 6:129
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS
ordinarily have cause to complain absent a breach of the terms of an
agreement by which the company's affairs were to be conducted. s
However, drawing a parallel to the analysis in Ebrahimi, in which the
court set forth factors justifying the equitable dissolution of a
corporation, 90 Lord Hoffman further stated that there will be cases in
which equity demands a finding of unfair prejudice, even if the
majority's actions were otherwise legal. 91  While Lord Hoffman
recognized that it would be impossible to define all the circumstances
in which equity would warrant a finding of unfairness, he noted that
existing equitable principles could sufficiently guide courts.
9 2
In dicta, Lord Hoffman provided one example of circumstances
warranting a finding of unfairness: in the absence of a contractual
understanding between the parties, if an event ends the basis on which
the parties entered the shareholder relationship, unfairness arises where
the majority uses its legal powers "to maintain the association in
circumstances to which the minority can reasonably say it did not
agree. 9 3 According to Lord Hoffman, unfairness also inevitably arises
out of the minority's exclusion without a reasonable offer to buy out his
shares or for some other special arrangement, and that a presumption of
unfair prejudice "does not seem ... very different in practice from the
present law.",94 However, Lord Hoffman's example of an equitable
89 Id. at 607 ("[A] member of a company will not ordinarily be entitled to
complain of unfairness unless there has been some breach of the terms on
which he agreed that the affairs of the company should be conducted.").
90 Id. at 607-08 (citing Ebrahimi, (1973) A.C. at 379-80) (stating that an
approach to unfair prejudice which considers equitable principles in assessing
unfairness "runs parallel" to the "concept of 'just and equitable' as a ground for
winding up").
91 Id. at 607 ("[T]here will be cases in which equitable considerations
make it unfair for those conducting the affairs of the company to rely upon their
strict legal powers. Thus unfairness may consist in a breach of the rules or in
using the rules in a manner which equity would regard as contrary to good
faith.").
92 Id. As articulated by the Steering Group, such equitable considerations
include well-establish equitable principles and others developed by courts. See
generally Developing the Framework, supra note 80, para. 4.106.
93 O'Neill, supra note 88, at 609 ("I do not suggest that exercising rights in
breach of some promise or undertaking is the only form of conduct which will
be regarded as unfair for purposes of section 459. For example, there may be
some event that puts an end to the basis upon which the parties entered the
association with each other, making it unfair that one shareholder should insist
upon the continuance of the association.").
94 Id.
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principle sufficient to warrant a finding of unfairness 95 and the view
that a presumption of unfair prejudice was, in essence, no different than
the existing state of law 96 appear in dicta. While the O'Neill decision
appeared to limit the grounds for bringing an unfair prejudice petition
to allegations based on breach of an agreement or a well-established
equitable principle, its parameters are far from clear.
97
Ultimately, the Steering Group rejected the presumption of unfair
prejudice based in part on the presumption's claimed inconsistency
with O'Neill. According to the Steering Group, the scope of the unfair
prejudice provision after O'Neill was more restrictive than indicated by
the Law Commission in its proposals. 98  To make out a claim of
unfairness after O'Neill, the Steering Group stated that a complaining
shareholder could not base his claim on "general notions of unfairness"
or solely on his reasonable expectations; 99 instead, he must rely on a
breach of an agreement or "a situation which permits or requires
[e]quity to intervene."' 00 Further, the Steering Group concluded that
viewing the structural conditions triggering the presumption as prima
facie evidence of unfair prejudice would be difficult where these
conditions do not involve breach of an agreement or a specific
equitable principle warranting a finding of unfairness.1 ' After the
95 Id. (noting that unfairness arising out of an event which makes it unfair
for one shareholder to insist on continuing the relationship "does not arise in
this case").
96 1d. at 614.
97 See BOYLE, supra note 19, at 127 ("O'Neill may well prove no more
than a method of 'theorizing' the concept of unfair prejudice. Its remedially
polymorphous character may survive the apparent 'contractual' straitjacket.").
98 Developing the Framework, supra note 79, para. 4.106 (noting that the
scope of section 459 is "of more restricted effect than indicated" by the Law
Commission's proposals). Cf BOYLE, supra note 19, at 127 ("O'Neill provides
much more leeway than the Steering Group's terse account of its reasoning
reveals.").
99 Developing the Framework, supra note 79, para. 4.108.
100 Id.
101 Id. para. 4.110. It is worth noting, however, that in his O'Neill opinion,
Lord Hoffman suggested that, upon an event which puts an end to the business
association and where a minority is excluded without an offer to buy out his
shares, unfairness inevitably arises, and a presumption of unfair prejudice
would do no more than achieve a similar result under present law. See O'Neill,
supra note 88, at 614. A codification of the presumption, however, might more
firmly ingrain Lord Hoffman's belief into present U.K. law.
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Steering Group expressed doubts over the presumption's consistency
with O'Neill, it invited responses from practitioners and other members
of the lawmaking bodies as to whether O'Neill should be reversed., 02
Subsequently, in Completing the Structure, the Steering Group
noted that responses to whether O'Neill should be reversed or
maintained were "very mixed."' 0 3 Most favored removing O'Neill's
"contractual" limitation to permit complaining shareholders to bring an
action under the unfair prejudice provision without first proving the
breach of some agreement.1°4 However, the Steering Group took a
"hard[ ] line against any change to existing law," deciding that ONeill
should not be reversed and dismissing the proposed presumptions
altogether. 10 5 The Steering Group ultimately decided that allegations of
unfair prejudice should be limited to cases where an action deviates
from an agreement between the parties, as broadly defined and
identified by words and conduct. 1
0 6
The Steering Group's Final Report confirms the rejection of the
proposal to amend the unfair prejudice remedy to raise the
presumptions. °7  Accordingly, in the recent re-enactment of the
Companies Act in 2006, the unfair prejudice remedy found in section
994 remains identical to the prior section 459.108
Despite its formal rejection as a matter of statutory reform in the
U.K., the presumption has been the focus of several commentators
promoting reform of minority shareholder remedies, both in the U.K.
and other countries. 0 9 While commentators suggest that the Steering
102 See id. para. 4.111.
103 Completing the Structure, supra note 80, paras. 5.77-5.79.
04 Id. para. 5.77.
105 BOYLE, supra note 19, at 126; see also Completing the Structure, supra
note 80, para. 5.76 ("We expressed views against presumptions and the
winding-up remedy and no responses supported either of those.").
106 Completing the Structure, supra note 80, para. 5.79. This stance
adopted by the Steering Group might reflect application of "contractarian"
theory to the unfair prejudice remedy, a trend which has influenced U.K. law in
the past two decades. See generally BOYLE, supra note 19, at 112-18.
107 See Final Report, supra note 81.
108 Compare U.K. Companies Act, 2006, pt. 30, §§ 994-996, with U.K.
Companies Act, 1985, pt. 17, §§459-461. For the current text of the operative
provision of the unfair prejudice remedy, see supra note 82.
109 See, e.g., BOYLE, supra note 19, at 126 (contending that the Steering
Group's rejection of the presumption as proposed by the Law Commission is
"regrettable" and "does not auger well for a constructive reform of the unfair
prejudice remedy in general or for a better procedure in the case of owner-
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Group's dismissal of the Law Commission's proposed presumptions
was premature and without careful consideration, "o some have gone so
far as to recommend the adoption of the presumption in other countries
as an appropriate means for both resolving relevant shareholder
conflicts and reducing shareholder oppression litigation.III
Whether the case for adopting the presumption of unfair
prejudice has been made in the U.K. remains a subject of contention,
but at a minimum, the Steering Group's review of the presumption was
arguably not as careful as it ought to have been. Given the uncertainty
of the scope of the unfair prejudice provision in light of O'Neill, the
proposed presumption would enhance the predictability of
determinations of unfair prejudice while preserving the flexibility, as
intended since the inception of the unfair prejudice provision, to
fashion an appropriate remedy. The presumption would provide
enhanced guidance to courts in analyzing claims of unfair prejudice,
thus resulting in more effectively managed claims.
managed companies" in the U.K.); Rita Cheung, The Statutory Minority
Remedies of Unfair Prejudice and Just and Equitable Winding Up: The English
Law Commission 's Recommendations as Models for Reform in Hong Kong,
19(5) INT'L CO. & COM. L. REv. 156, 162-63 (2008) (recommending
consideration of the adoption of the presumption of unfair prejudice in Hong
Kong as a means to "reduce the incidence of protracted and expensive litigation
by providing a more predictable procedure"); John H. Farrar & Laurence
Boulle, Minority Shareholder Remedies: Shifting Dispute Resolution
Paradigms, 13(2) BOND L. REv. Article 3 (2001) (recommending consideration
of the adoption of the presumption of unfair prejudice in Australia as part of an
alternative dispute resolution paradigm in assessing minority shareholder
complaints).
110 See BOYLE, supra note 19, at 133 ("The over-cautious views expressed
in Developing the Framework seem to be regrettably negative and hesitant.
The level of argument is rather superficial compared with that in the Law
Commission's Consultation Paper and Report."); Cheung, supra note 109, at
158 (contending that the Law Commission's basis for rejecting the presumption
of unfair prejudice was not "entirely convincing" and was "based on certain
rudimentary and unchallenged assumptions").
11 See Cheung, supra note 109, at 156-164 (contending that the Steering
Group's rejection of the presumption overstated its defects and that it provides
a useful model for reform of minority shareholder remedies in Hong Kong);
Farrar & Boulle, supra note 109, at 2 (recommending consideration of the U.K.
Law Commission's presumption of unfair prejudice in Australia as device
"designed to prevent and limit disputes involving minority shareholders").
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III. OPPRESSIVE CONDUCT IN THE U.S.: A PRESUMPTION
TRIGGERED BY THE MINORITY'S EXCLUSION FROM
MANAGEMENT
Professor Miller has stated that a presumption of oppressive
conduct upon a minority shareholder's exclusion from management-
though rejected by U.K. lawmakers-has relevance in the U.S.1
12
Nevertheless, she argues that a presumption of oppressive conduct
should not be adopted in the U.S. because it would not effectively assist
the resolution of U.S. shareholder disputes since disputes in the U.S.
involve varied types of factual allegations that do not always fulfill the
conditions triggering the presumption. 13 Further, Miller argues that
presuming oppressive conduct in all cases of exclusion, particularly
those in which the minority shareholder precipitated his own exclusion
from management, would be unfair."H
4
However, the concerns raised over the presumption's usefulness
in the U.S. are misguided. First, a presumption of oppression arising
from the minority's exclusion from management and other structural
conditions would correct vagueness in defining oppression, which
makes existing U.S. approaches to resolving minority shareholder
disputes difficult to apply with any consistency or degree of certainty.
Second, the presumption promotes judicial efficiency and functions as
a practical, predictable procedural device for effectively handling
shareholder disputes based on allegations of exclusion while retaining
the flexibility necessary for awarding appropriate remedies on a case-
by-case basis. Third, the presumption, tailored to the context of the
owner-managed company, recognizes the unique nature of the close
corporation and safeguards against the majority's abuse of control,
which further encourages minority shareholder participation.
12 See Miller, supra note 17, at 622 (noting that, given the similarities in
the statutory remedies for unfair prejudice and oppressive conduct in the U.K.
and U.S., respectively, the U.K. Law Commission's proposed presumptions
"should be of great interest to the U.S. legal community"). Cf Benjamin
Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority
Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207 (2009)
(proposing an alternative approach to minority shareholder oppression in the
U.S. where the level of judicial scrutiny is dependent upon minority
shareholder voice).
13 See Miller, supra note 17, at 624.
1141id.
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A. THE INADEQUACIES OF US. APPROACHES TO MINORITY
SHAREHOLDER OPPRESSION: THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE
GUIDANCE IN DEFINING OPPRESSION
As discussed in Part I.B, U.S. courts and legislatures have
developed various statutory and common law remedies to address the
problem of minority shareholder oppression. Most states have adopted
dissolution statutes modeled after the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act, which provide for involuntary judicial dissolution
upon the majority's illegal, oppressive, or fraudulent conduct 1 5 While
some state legislatures have attempted to define by statute what types
of conduct warrant a finding of oppression,1 16 most state dissolution
statutes do not define such conduct, leaving the task to courts and
common law jurisprudence. 
1 1 7
Thus, courts face the difficulty of defining with some precision
what constitutes oppression without defining it so narrowly as to
impede the equitable goal of protecting a minority shareholder's
investment. While no all-encompassing definition for oppression
exists, courts typically define oppression in one of three ways:
oppression as breach of the minority shareholder's "reasonable
expectations," oppression as breach of a fiduciary duty, and oppression
as "wrongful conduct" or "bad faith."' 18 However, as discussed below,
none of these definitions standing alone provides a court with sufficient
guidance in determining oppressive conduct while permitting the
flexibility necessary to equitably remedy oppression on a case-by-case
basis.
Many U.S. state courts follow the "reasonable expectations"
approach which recognizes that members of a closely held corporation
typically invest with the expectation of being an employee or helping to
manage the corporation, even in the absence of an express agreement
illustrating those expectations. 1 9  As typically described, the
115 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
116 See supra note 43.
117 See supra note 44 and Part I.B.
118 Art supra note 44, at 376. See also Means, supra note 112, at 1220
(noting that current oppression doctrine can be grouped into three distinct
categories: "reasonable expectations," "fiduciary duty," and "bad faith").
119 See Douglas K. Moll, Reasonable Expectations v. Implied-in-Fact
Contracts: Is the Shareholder Oppression Doctrine Needed?, 42 B.C. L. REv.
154 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 6:129
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS
reasonable expectations approach emphasizes the minority's
management-related interests-i.e., what the minority shareholder
"reasonably expected"-viewed objectively, over the majority's
challenged conducts.
1 20
However, the reasonable expectations approach is not seamless
for two related reasons. As a general matter, the approach involves
establishing a party's expectations either by an actual agreement or in
the absence of any actual agreement between the parties or in a case in
which the court has to disregard an actual agreement between the
parties. A court must determine what expectations are "reasonable."
Thus, commentators first criticize that in defining the parties'
reasonable expectations as what objective parties would have agreed to,
courts are merely superimposing judicially-defined expectations. 121
Second, commentators criticize that identifying the relevant
expectations by an actual agreement between the parties reduces the
predictability of current and future determinations by relying on
particular, subjective facts rather than a generally applicable, objective
rule. Thus, handling claims of oppression in this case-by-case manner
989, 1002 (2001) (contending that, of the three primary approaches to
oppression, the reasonable expectations standard "garners the most approval,
and courts have increasingly used it to determine whether oppressive conduct
has taken place"); see also Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 679 (noting
that U.S. states have increasingly employed the reasonable expectations
approach to define whether majority conduct is oppressive). In addition, some
U.K. courts have employed the reasonable expectations approach to define
unfairly prejudicial conduct for purpose of the provision. Miller, supra note
17, at 581. See, e.g., In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (quoting F. Hodge
O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform,
33 Bus. LAW. 873, 884 (1978)).
120 Matheson & Maler, supra note 11, at 677 ("Under this [the reasonable
expectations] approach, a court could find oppression by focusing on how the
actions of the majority interfered with what the minority shareholder
reasonably expected would happen when she invested in and joined the
enterprise.").
121 See Miller, supra note 17, at 615 ("[I]n the United States and the
United Kingdom[,] courts are not merely interpreting the parties' actual express
or implied agreement. Rather, courts seem to be superimposing a set of
expectations that the parties will conduct themselves in a judicially defined
manner."); cf Christopher A. Riley, Contracting Out of Company Law: Section
459 of the Companies Act 1985 and the Role of the Courts, 55 MOD. L. REV.
782, 796-98 (1992) (contending that rather then ascertaining the expectations of
the parties, courts employing the reasonable expectation analysis are
"developing their [the court's] own mandatory judicial paradigm").
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leaves parties, practitioners, and courts with little guidance for
determining what acts will constitute oppression in the future.
122
Two other approaches to defining oppressive conduct exist in the
U.S. One approach defines oppressive conduct as the breach of a
fiduciary duty.' 23 Defining oppression as breach of a fiduciary duty
requires consideration of what duties shareholders owe one another.
Some courts have likened the relationship between shareholders in a
close corporation to that of members of a partnership, thus requiring
majority shareholders to adhere to a heightened fiduciary standard.
2 4
However, it remains unclear exactly what the specific duties of a
majority shareholder in a close corporation are. 12 5 For example, a court
cannot generally require that a majority shareholder, like a partner,
place the minority's interest above all else because this would
overprotect the minority shareholder and substantially interfere with
majority rule. 126 Since the nature of the fiduciary duties owed among
shareholders determines the legitimacy of majority actions, the
fiduciary duty approach requires more specific direction as to exactly
what is required or prohibited of shareholders before it can provide
effective guidance in assessing oppression.
122 See Miller, supra note 17, at 617 (noting the uncertainty caused by a
vague reasonable expectations test and describing such confusion as "the
necessary by-product of any case-by-case legal analysis").
123 See Art, supra note 44, at 376.
124 Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505,
515 (Mass. 1975) ("[W]e hold that stockholders in the close corporation owe
one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the
enterprise that partners owe to one another."). The Donahue court described
the duties owed among partners in a partnership as the "utmost good faith and
loyalt%." Id. at 516 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928)).
12 Under the Donahue facts, it appeared that a minority shareholder could
successfully allege that the majority breached a fiduciary duty owed where the
minority is denied an "equal opportunity" or is otherwise treated unequally. Id.
at 518. However, in a subsequent decision, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
revised this analysis and, where the minority shareholder brings suit alleging a
breach of fiduciary duty owed, placed the burden on the majority to
demonstrate a legitimate business purpose for the action. See Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976).
'
26 See Art, supra note 44, at 387-89 (noting that the parameters of the
fiduciary duties imposed on controlling shareholders "are not precisely
defined" and "exist in constant and avoidable tension" with the corporate
concept of majority rule).
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A third interpretation of oppression defines the term as arising
from "wrongful conduct." Courts following this approach recognize no
special, judicially-created protections for minority shareholders in close
corporations, aside from bargained-for protections. 127  These courts
treat minority shareholders like shareholders in a public corporation
and stress that minority shareholders remain free to negotiate for
protections at the outset of the business relationship. 2 In essence, a
complaining minority shareholder under this third approach must
overcome the business judgment rule not by making general allegations
of unfairness but by showing that the majority's conduct was otherwise
fraudulent 129 or conflicted. 130  However, where the complaining
minority shareholder challenges the majority's action as oppressive and
the transaction at issue is one in which the majority is not entitled to the
protection of the business judgment rule, the burden lies with the
majority to prove the inherent fairness of the transaction.'
3
1
One criticism of the bad faith approach is that it fails to recognize
the unique nature of the close corporation. Many close corporations are
based on familial or personal relationships. When parties form a
corporation expecting these business relationships to remain intact,
127 Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993).
128 Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1380 ("The tools of good corporate practice are
designed to give a purchasing minority stockholder the opportunity to bargain
for protection before parting with consideration. It would do violence to
normal corporate practice and our corporation law to fashion an ad hoc ruling
which would result in a court-imposed stockholder buyout for which the parties
had not contracted."); Richards v. Bryan, 879 P.2d 638, 648 (Kan. Ct. App.
1994).
129 Richards, 879 P.2d at 648 ("'[D]irectors have the power to control and
direct the affairs of the corporation, and in the absence of fraud, courts will
generally not interfere on behalf of a dissatisfied stockholder with the
discretion of the directors on questions of corporate management, policy or
business."') (quoting Sampson v. Hunt, 665 P.2d 743 (Kan. 1983)) (emphasis
removed).
130 One articulation of "wrongful conduct" sufficient to warrant a finding
of oppression under this approach describes the term as "burdensome, harsh
and wrongful conduct . . . or a visible departure from the standards of fair
dealing, and a violation of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts
his money to a corporation is entitled to rely." See Art, supra note 44, at 376-
77 (quoting Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 358 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976)). However, this articulation may provide little help to courts in defining
oppressive conduct, as the definition is "plainly vague" and arguably rephrases
the standard rather than defining with any precision what type of conduct is
oppressive and the basis for finding such. Id. at 377.
"'1 Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1375-76.
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insisting that the parties bargain for protections may be unrealistic
because admitting that a shareholder might need protection may
undermine the business relationship. Thus, a focus on the minority
shareholder's bargained-for protections is not helpful in situations
where the minority would not ordinarily have bargained for protections.
A second problem with the bad faith approach is that it sets too high a
burden on minority shareholder complainants. By requiring a minority
shareholder to establish the majority's flagrant, wrongful conduct, the
approach, in combination with the business judgment rule, creates a
potential for courts to adopt an overly deferential stance to the
majority's action. This problem is exacerbated where the minority
shareholder does not retain access to the information necessary to meet
the burden of demonstrating the majority's misconduct.
132
In sum, the various approaches courts in the U.S. have used to
define oppression fail to provide the guidance necessary to determine
with any precision whether particular acts constitute oppression. In
addition to its unpredictable nature, the reasonable expectations
approach requires courts to identify each shareholder's pertinent
expectations and determine whether those expectations are reasonable
without any particularized test for reasonableness. The fiduciary duty
approach fails to offer meaningful guidance as to the heightened duties
owed among shareholders. Finally, the bad faith approach fails to
recognize the unique nature of the close corporation and further
imposes a high burden on complaining minority shareholders.
B. PRESUMING OPPRESSION UPON EXCLUSION: PROMOTING
JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY
Shareholder litigation embroils parties in disputing highly factual
matters, expending judicial time and resources, while also working a
detriment to the continuation of the business relationship. The U.K.
132 See O'NEAL & DERWIN, supra note 6, §1.04, at 6 (noting that one
common effect resulting from the "squeeze-out" of a minority shareholder in a
close corporation is the majority's withholding of "information on the affairs of
the business and on policies being adopted and decisions being made"); Means,
supra note 112, at 1249 (noting that one of the justifications for a "voice-
based" trigger for enhanced judicial scrutiny is that the minority shareholder
lacking voice will not possess the information necessary to challenge the
majority's action).
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Law Commission's recommendation to codify a presumption of unfair
prejudice upon the minority's exclusion from management reflects an
effort to direct courts to employ more effective case management
techniques, to reduce costly and time-consuming litigation, and to
minimize the highly factual nature of the circumstances surrounding the
dispute. In light of the similarities between private companies in the
U.S. and in the U.K., 13 3 a presumption of oppression in the U.S. would
produce similar benefits. Specifically, it would encourage settlement
among parties involved in shareholder oppression litigation. Secondly,
a presumption arising upon the fulfillment of certain structural
conditions would permit courts assessing oppression claims to
scrutinize limited factual circumstances and to retain the flexibility
necessary to fashion an equitable remedy between the parties.'
34
A presumption of oppressive conduct in the U.S. would provide
courts with a procedural mechanism to encourage settlement and foster
judicial efficiency. As proposed by the U.K. Law Commission, the
presumption of oppression would arise upon fulfillment of certain
"structural factors."' 35  Because these factors expressly narrow the
scope of facts purported to constitute oppression to certain incidents
arising immediately before the exclusion, a presumption based on such
factors "has the advantage of being readily ascertainable by reference
to the current or recent state of the company's affairs."' 36 The adoption
of a similar presumption in the U.S. would provide parties and their
133 U.K. "private companies" possess many of the same characteristics as
closely held corporations in the U.S. Investors in the U.K. private company
and in the U.S. closely held corporation enjoy limited shareholder liability.
Additionally, both corporate forms are subjected to fewer formalities, including
relaxed capital requirements and centralized management. For a
comprehensive discussion of U.K. private companies, see Simon Goulding, The
Private Company in the United Kingdom, in THE EUROPEAN PRIVATE
COMPANY? 55, 59-62 (Harm-Jan De Kluiver & Walter Van Gerven eds., 1995).
134 Because one factor triggering the presumption requires the exclusion of
the minority from management, the presumption would call for more exacting
judicial scrutiny upon the minority shareholder's diminished ability to
participate in the affairs of the corporation. The presumption is consistent with
a "voice-based" approach to evaluating claims of minority shareholder
oppression that recommends employing flexible judicial scrutiny depending on
the presence or absence of minority shareholder participation in governance.
See Means, supra note 112. Where the challenged exclusion of the minority
has diminished the minority shareholder's ability to participate in business
affairs, this "voice-based" framework would lead courts to apply enhanced
judicial scrutiny. Id.
135 See supra notes 68-9 and Part II.A.
136 BOYLE, supra note 19, at 123; supra note 68.
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counsel the opportunity to assess the substance of oppression claims
and to predict a court's likely response at an early stage. Because the
presumption would enable parties to predict the outcome of litigation
with some level of certainty, the parties may be more likely to settle,
thus avoiding the burdens of extensive litigation altogether. As one
British commentator favoring the presumption has suggested, the use of
the presumption in the U.K. "might encourage more of such claims [the
common case of expulsion from management in owner-managed
companies] to be settled either out of court or before a hearing."
1 37
Where parties forego settlement and instead pursue litigation, a
presumption of oppression may promote judicial efficiency by
narrowing the factual issues presented to the court to those facts
occurring immediately before the exclusion. This allows courts to
more carefully scrutinize the particular facts giving rise to the
minority's exclusion and reduces the time and expense associated with
litigation. As noted in the U.K. Law Commission's drafting of the
presumption, litigation among shareholders creates "the potential for
complex factual disputes of a historical nature." 138 However, the use of
structural elements in triggering a presumption of oppression permits a
more objective determination of oppression based on fewer disputable
circumstances. Rather than focusing on the reasonable expectations of
the parties, more rigid criteria provide a readily workable, less fact-
intensive means of analyzing the substance of the claim. Instead of
deciphering whether the parties manifested any actual or implied
agreement, or merely substituting judicially crafted expectations in lieu
of the parties' agreement, courts can more carefully scrutinize the
specific incident giving rise to the minority's expulsion from
management. Accordingly, where courts focus on the immediate
circumstances giving rise to the current claim, they can avoid the
problems presented by the reasonable expectations test discussed in
Part III.A.
While a presumption of oppression triggered upon certain
ascertainable criteria provides a more predictable and efficient
alternative to assessing claims of minority shareholder oppression, the
operation of the presumption retains flexibility for minority
shareholders pursuing claims of oppression in which the conditions
137 BOYLE, supra note 19, at 125-26.
138 See Report No. 246, supra note 52, para. 3.35.
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triggering the presumption are unsatisfied. 139  In such a case,
petitioning shareholders may still pursue their claims of oppression by
proving that the majority's actions constituted oppression under an
existing approach to defining the term.
A presumption of oppressive conduct upon the minority's
exclusion from management also retains the flexibility necessary to
achieve an equitable remedy between the parties and to prevent
unfairness to the majority shareholder respondent. The U.K. Law
Commission drafted its presumption of unfair prejudice with the intent
that it be rebuttable. 40 Thus, a respondent would have the opportunity
to demonstrate that the exclusion of the minority shareholder from
management did not amount to oppressive conduct. Where the
majority shareholder proves to the court's satisfaction that the
exclusion did not amount to oppressive conduct, the court retains the
flexibility in ruling against the minority shareholder. However, where
the majority shareholder fails to rebut the presumption, the court retains
the broad discretion to impose one of a wide range of equitable
remedies, meaning that the drastic remedy of dissolution would not be
a necessary consequence of a finding of oppression.
In sum, a presumption of oppression based on the U.K. Law
Commission's model would maintain flexibility for both complaining
shareholders and for courts in fashioning equitable remedies; it would
avoid an overly deferential approach to the majority's action; and it
would result in a more efficient and predictable procedure.
C. PRESUMING OPPRESSION UPON EXCLUSION. A
PROTECTION AGAINST THE MAJORITY SHAREHOLDER'S ABUSE
OF CONTROL
As discussed in the Introduction, a minority shareholder in a
closely held corporation exposes himself to an inherent risk of
oppression caused by the unique nature of the closely held corporate
form. At least one of the U.S. approaches to analyzing claims of
minority shareholder oppression, namely the bad faith approach which
recognizes no special protections for minority shareholders beyond
139 Cf BOYLE, supra note 19, at 123 (noting that the presumption would
provide a minority shareholder flexibility in pursuing unfair prejudice claims
because, where the factors necessary to trigger the presumption are unsatisfied,
a minority shareholder may still pursue an unfair prejudice petition by
otherwise showing that the majority's conduct was unfairly prejudicial); Report
No. 246, supra note 52, para. 3.37.
140 See supra note 65 and Part II.A.
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those negotiated for, fails to adequately adapt to the specialized nature
of the close corporation. On the other hand, to impose a presumption
of oppressive conduct when the majority has excluded the minority
from management is to recognize that closely held corporations are
unique entities and that the exclusion of the minority from participation
in corporate affairs may reflect the majority's scheme to squeeze-out
the minority shareholder. In fact, a presumption of oppression would
operate to safeguard against the majority's abuse of control.
Because the majority holds a controlling share of voting rights,
the majority can elect and control directors. By way of these positions
of control and influence in corporate decision-making, majority
shareholders possess poweis that enable them to "squeeze-out' 4' the
minority. One common squeeze-out technique, typically used in
conjunction with various others, includes the expulsion of minority
shareholders from directorial or other employment positions.142 This
technique often forms part of a broader plan to rid the corporation of its
most vulnerable members. Upon exclusion and in the absence of any
shareholder agreement to the contrary, the minority shareholder
essentially becomes helpless in retaining his directorial position. 143 In
addition to the diminished ability to participate in company affairs, the
minority shareholder faces other detrimental consequences flowing
from the squeeze-out. 144 While the minority shareholder may seek
141 One definition of "squeeze-outs," also known as "freeze-outs,"
describes the term as "the use [of strategic position, inside information, or
powers of control, or the utilization of some legal device or technique] by some
of the owners or participants in a business enterprise ... to eliminate from the
enterprise one or more of its owners or participants." O'NEAL & DERWIN,
supra note 6, §1.01, at 3.
142 See id. §3.05, at 52-54 ("Eliminating minority shareholders from
directorate and excluding them from company employment").
14" Id. § 3.05, at 54 (noting that, upon his squeeze-out from the company
and in the absence of a shareholder agreement so providing, a minority
shareholder can neither "compel the majority shareholders to elect him a
director or the directors to make him an officer," nor can he institute a claim for
dissolution unless "in cases of extreme abuse").
144 The "losses and injustices" a minority shareholder suffers as a result of
a squeeze-out are "catastrophic." Id. §1.04, at 6. Such losses include the
deprivation of "any effective voice in the making of business decisions"; the
majority's withholding of information relating to the affairs, policies, and
decisions of the business; the loss of expected employment; and the economic
deprivation of his investment. Id.
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relief by asserting a claim for oppression, given the difficulties
presented by U.S. oppression doctrine, the minority shareholder might
find the outcome unsatisfying.
In formulating its proposed presumption of unfair prejudice upon
a minority shareholder's exclusion from management, the U.K. Law
Commission explicitly noted that the conditions triggering the
presumption would target the "owner-managed" company.145
Accordingly, the Law Commission proposed that the presumption
apply only to private companies limited by shares and to cases in
which, immediately before the exclusion, all or substantially all
shareholders occupied director positions. 146  These measures
represented a conscious effort to tailor the presumption of unfair
prejudice to the owner-managed company, a corporate structure prone
to shareholder disputes, particularly when the majority abuses its
control and exerts its power and influence to the minority's detriment.
In the U.S., a presumption of the majority's oppressive conduct
upon the minority's expulsion from management and the fulfillment of
a few other conditions would safeguard against the majority's abuse of
control by requiring proof of the legitimacy of its action. Importantly,
the presumption also places the burden on the party most able to carry
it. 147 Arguing that the presumption may be inappropriate in the U.S.,
one commentator believes that it would be unfair to presume that
majority misconduct caused the minority shareholder's exclusion,
particularly where the minority shareholder precipitated the
expulsion.148 However, any argument of "unfairness" overlooks the
vulnerability of the minority shareholder in the closely held corporation
and the considerable likelihood that the minority's expulsion was the
product of an effort to thwart the minority's participation and to deprive
him of the financial benefit flowing from his original investment.
When the majority has excluded the minority for sound,
legitimate reasons, the majority can rebut the presumption of unfair
conduct. Thus, the presumption accounts for the squeeze-out scenario
and properly places the onus on the majority shareholder respondent to
145 See supra note 75 and Part II.A.
146 See supra Part II.A.
147 Because squeezed-out minority shareholders often lack the information
necessary to establish a claim of oppression in the actual event of the majority's
abuse of control, the majority possesses the requisite information to rebut the
allegation and can do so if the minority's exclusion was truly a legitimate
decision.
148 See Miller, supra note 17, at 624.
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show that the exclusion does not amount to an abuse of control.
Accordingly, the presumption would likely have the effect of deterring
exclusion of minority shareholders for illegitimate reasons, thus
fostering minority shareholder participation in management.
IV. APPLYING THE PRESUMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES
While the U.K. Law Commission's proposed codification of a
statutory presumption of unfair prejudice was not adopted in the re-
enactment of the Companies Act in 2006, U.S. courts can incorporate a
presumption of oppression into a framework including existing
approaches and treat the presumption as a procedural mechanism to
help define oppression and assess shareholder disputes. To rebut the
presumption of oppression, the respondent majority shareholder can
demonstrate that his conduct was not oppressive under the
jurisdiction's particular approach to defining the term. This Part
illustrates the applicability of the presumption by considering the facts
of two classic U.S. cases in which the minority shareholder alleged
oppression following exclusion from management in the close
corporation.
In Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., four investors -
Riche, Wilkes, Quinn, and Pipkin - formed a closely held corporation
as an investment vehicle for purchasing property to build and operate a
nursing home. 149 Each of the four owners initially invested $1,000 in
the business, and each owner held equal interest in the corporation.
150
At the outset of the business venture, each owner expected to serve as a
director and to participate actively in the management and affairs of the
corporation.' 5 1 However, after dissension arose between Quinn and
Wilkes affecting the relationship among all four owners, the other
owners did not re-elect Wilkes either as a director or officer of the
149 Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass.
1976). The business was incorporated in Massachusetts, a state following the
Fiduciary Duty approach to minority shareholder oppression as first set forth in
the Donahue decision. See supra Part III.A.
150 Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 659-60.
'1 Id. ("At the time of incorporation it was understood by all of the parties
that each would be a director of Springside and each would participate actively
in the management and decision making involved in operating the
corporation.") (footnote omitted).
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corporation. 152 After his exclusion from management, Wilkes brought
suit against the other owners and the corporation alleging that the
owners breached fiduciary duties owed to him as a minority
shareholder in the corporation.'
53
The Wilkes facts would trigger the presumption of oppression
and would require the respondent shareholders to rebut the
presumption. The majority shareholder excluded the complaining
minority shareholder from the management of a privately held
corporation, and immediately before such exclusion, all of the owners
held director positions, and the complaining shareholder held more than
10% of the voting rights. The respondent owners could rebut the
presumption by demonstrating a legitimate business purpose for their
actions or by otherwise proving that their conduct was not oppressive
under the fiduciary duty approach to defining oppression. However,
under the court's analysis and in light of the facts, it was apparent that
the majority shareholders could not prove a non-oppressive, legitimate
purpose for their action. 154 Thus, the outcome under a presumption of
oppression would likely be the same as the actual outcome.
A second case involving exclusion of a minority shareholder
from managerial decision-making also illustrates the applicability of
the presumption. In Pedro v. Pedro, three brothers - Alfred, Carl, and
Eugene Pedro - owned equal interests in a Minnesota closely held
corporation.155 Each of the brothers was also a long-time employee of
the corporation, and each received equal compensation. 156 After Alfred
discovered a discrepancy with the financial records of the business,
which he brought to the attention of his brothers, his brothers placed
him on a temporary leave of absence and therefore froze him out of
management before ultimately firing him from his employment
position with the company. Alfred later brought suit against his
brothers under the Minnesota state dissolution statute, alleging that the
brothers engaged in oppressive conduct.1
58
152 Id. at 660-61.
' Id. at 659.
114 Id. at 663 ("[I]t is apparent that the majority stockholders in Springside
have not shown a legitimate business purpose ... for refusing to reelect him as
a salaried officer and director.").
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While the Pedro case involves the discharge of an owner-
employee rather than removal of an owner-director, a presumption of
oppression could still apply. In drafting the presumption of unfair
prejudice, the U.K. Law Commission suggested that actions other than
a minority's formal removal as director could "constitute exclusion
from management of the company for the purposes of the
presumption[]."' 59 Examples of such conduct include the majority's
failure either to consult the minority on major decisions, to invite the
minority to board meetings, or to supply the minority with other
pertinent information. 160 These actions constitute various techniques
employed to squeeze-out the minority. Likewise, the squeeze-out
technique of firing a minority shareholder from a position of
employment, particularly when the majority then distributes profits in
the form of exorbitant salaries, might constitute exclusion for purposes
of the presumption.
Assuming, for purposes of applying the presumption to the Pedro
facts, that Alfred's discharge from a position of employment constitutes
exclusion from management, the Pedro facts would trigger the
presumption of oppressive conduct. Immediately before the exclusion,
Alfred held a one-third interest in the closely held corporation in which
all of the owners served as long-time employees involved in the
management of the company. However, once the presumption arose,
the respondent shareholders could rebut the presumption by arguing
that the firing of Alfred did not constitute oppressive conduct for
purposes of the state dissolution statute because Alfred had no
reasonable expectation to maintain his position of employment in
perpetuity or to otherwise participate in the company's management.
Ultimately, given the facts, this argument would likely be unsuccessful
because Alfred's brothers had no legitimate reason for firing him, and
the outcome would likely be the same as the actual decision of the
Pedro court.
While these two cases illustrate that a presumption of oppression
may produce outcomes similar to those decided under existing U.S.
oppression doctrine, the presumption would arrive at these decisions in
a more efficient manner because it would limit the facts a court
159 See Report No. 246, supra note 52, para. 3.41 (noting that "a
shareholder could be excluded from participating in the management of the
company without any need to be formally removed as director").
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examines in finding oppression and would place the burden on the
party most apt to meet it.
CONCLUSION
A presumption of oppression upon the minority shareholder's
exclusion from management and the fulfillment of certain other
conditions, first proposed as a matter of statutory reform in the U.K., is
a useful procedural device that would provide U.S. courts with a more
predictable and efficient alternative in handling claims of minority
shareholder oppression. Operating within a framework that
incorporates the current approaches to defining oppression, the
presumption would improve existing U.S. oppression doctrine.
